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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/07/2011

Accident number: 748

Accident time: 10:35

Accident Date: 10/05/2009

Where it occurred: AF/1023/08097,
MF0086, Bayan Khail
Village, Jaji District,
Paktya Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 16/06/2009

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: steep slope
Date last modified: 11/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
protective equipment not worn (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

1

File date: 16th June 2009
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-02 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC S-East to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the De-miner [Demining group] DT-02. The accident occurred at 10:35
hours on 10 May 2009 at minefield number AF/1023/08097/MF0086, located in Bayan Khail
village, Jaji district of Paktya province.
SUMMARY:
Minefield # AF/1023/08097/MF 0086 is located in Bayan Khail village Jaji district of Paktya
province. From the military point of view the Jaji district was one of the strategic places during
the Russian invasion in Afghanistan, as it is located on the border with Pakistan and had been
using as a major access way by Mujahedeen therefore, Russian troops heavily laid mines in
different parts of this district. The majority of minefields in Jaji district are on the hillsides as it
is a mountainous district.
On 10 May 2009 at 10:35 [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] DT-02 was excavating
on a detected signal in his clearance lane where he hit the top of an anti-personnel mine by
bayonet and it caused the mine going off. The procedure of investigating a pinpointed signal
was ignored by this deminer and he was working carelessly. As a result this accident the
deminer got several injuries to different parts of body i.e. both hands and thighs. The deminer
had only used the jacket of his PPE without skirt. If he would wear the skirt too, his lower
limbs would have been protected. Investigation shows that the helmet and visor has been
used properly.
As the majority of minefields in Jaji district are located on the hillsides, so the likelihood of
mines with changed position exists due to raining hence a comprehensive site operations
plan was required to consider all the predictable scenarios during the clearance operations
e.g. mines direction changes, mine displacement etc. But this point was missed in the site
operations plan.
CONCLUSIONS:
The carelessness of deminer, poor command and control and poor management of the team
caused the accident to happen.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
•

As outlined in investigation report, [Demining group] operations department is
recommended to conduct special revision training for this team and the training
package should be shared with the MACCA OPS department prior to start the
training.

•

The investigation team also recommended for provision of mechanical support to
demining teams in Jaji that which needs to be considered.

•

Internal QA is to be strengthened and focus on main contributing factors to an
accident.

•

The management of [Demining group] is requested to respond to MACCA with a
management solution that, identify why this accident happened and how they can
prevent the recurrence of such accident in the future. We expect to receive [Demining
group]’s official response by no later than 24th June 2009.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 939

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Hands; severe Legs
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "the deminer got several injuries to
different parts of body i.e. both hands and thighs".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the task planning was inadequate and that the Victim was not wearing
appropriate PPE and not working with appropriate caution, but these errors were not
corrected. The failure to plan the Task properly was also a significant Management Control
Inadequacy. The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators
recommended that refresher training was necessary.
The PPE “skirt” mentioned in the report is not explained but is presumed to be an extension to
the frontal blast protection commonly used.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.
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